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I 
Abstract 
The overall aim of this thesis is to analyze Kenya’s 2016 Water Act and to describe the 
tensions and conflicts that have emerged from the launch and implementation of the Water 
Act 2016. More specifically the thesis highlights what the Act represents and defines as 
the major problem(s) with regards to how Kenya’s water resources, supply and services 
should be managed, developed and regulated. This thesis discusses the tensions and 
conflicts the Act has spurred in the administration of Kenya’s water sector. In order to 
address what the Act represents as the primary problem(s) as to how Kenya’s water 
resources, supply and services should be managed, developed and regulated, the thesis 
draw on Bacchi’s (2009) What’s the Problem Represented to Be? (WPR) approach. In 
order to address what tensions and conflicts the Act have generated in Kenya’s water 
sector, this thesis will draw on the concept of discourse. Drawing on the evidence from the 
Act and debates surrounding it, this thesis reveals that the Act is about reorganising the 
whole water sector into a devolved structure to fit Kenya’s new constitution from 2010. 
The Act describes the transfer of the state organs and their functions and services from the 
national government to the local governments. The focus on the transfer of state organs to 
governments has strong implications for the design of the water sector, policy dialogue 
and efforts to achieve water scarcity in Kenya. 
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1 Introduction 
Achieving water security and sustainable use of our water resources are critical challenges of the 
21st Century. According to Water Aid’s (2018) annual report, about 60% of the world’s 
population live in areas of water stress and one out of nine people worldwide do not have access 
to clean water close to home. The report ranks Kenya among the ten countries with the lowest 
access to water close to home in relation to population. Close to half of Kenya’s population of 46 
million is estimated to live under such circumstances. 
Kenya is also one of the countries categorised by the United Nations as a chronically water-
scarce country, with an estimated freshwater supply of only 647 cubic meters per capita as 
compared to the universal minimum of 1,000 cubic meters per capita (UNDP, 2012 p. 23). 
Moreover, the country’s water resource base is estimated to decrease by the year 2025 as the 
population is expected to increase, thus affecting the water supply capacity (Krhoda, 2006; 
UNEP, 2008 see Ogendi, Ong ’oa and Ong ’, 2009  p. 183; Otieno, 2016). 
Sound operational policies, legislation, laws and strategy papers that guide the governance of 
water resources are central for achieving provision of safe water and sanitation. Similar to other 
African countries, the Kenyan government undertook a series of water sector reforms including 
the 1974 National Water Master Plan to ensure the provision of potable water to all households 
by the year 2000. In 1999, the Water Master Plan was replaced by a National Policy on Water 
Resources Management and Development. The National Policy from 1999 aimed at improving 
Kenya’s water supply by handing over water service delivery systems from the government to 
local and private actors (Ogendi, Ong ’oa and Ong ’, 2009). 
In 2002 the Kenyan Government launched a new Water Act in which local authorities were 
required to form autonomous water and sewerage companies with independent Water Boards of 
Directors to provide water supply services. The local authorities were required to reinvest 
financial returns acquired from water supply services into service delivery (Ogendi, Ong ’oa and 
Ong ’, 2009). Another important feature of the 2002 Act was the encouragement of a “bottom-up 
approach” that emphasised the role and active participation of local communities in the decision-
making process and implementation of local water projects (ibid). 
2 
When Kenya changed its Constitution in 2010, there was a need to update and change the 2002 
Water Act. The Constitution of 2010 changed Kenya’s political governance into two tiers 
comprising of one central national government and 47 decentralised county governments (ibid). 
The year 2016 marked the time when the constitutional arrangements of the political governance 
were to take full effect (ibid). 
In October 2016, a new Water Act 2016 was gazetted (Government of Kenya, 2016).
1
 The Act
states that its fundamental purpose is “to provide for the regulation, management and 
development of water resources, water supply and sewerage services, and related purposes” 
(Kenya Water Act, 2016). The Act recognizes that the responsibility for the provision of water-
related functions is a shared obligation between the national government and decentralized 
county governments and gives priority to the use of water for home consumption over irrigation 
and other purposes (ibid).  Its launch has spurred a number of tensions and controversies within 
Kenya’s administration of justice. The Council of Governors (CoG)2, have moved to court with a
desire to stop the implementation of the new Act, arguing that it is “unconstitutional”, as it omits 
county (local) governments from decision making and creates a centralised framework for 
provision and regulation of water services (ConstructionReviewOnline, 2016). 
The overall aim of this thesis is to analyze Kenya’s 2016 Water Act and to describe the tensions 
and conflicts that have emerged from the launch and implementation of the 2016 Water Act. 
More specifically the thesis explores the following research questions: 
a) What does the Act represent and define as the major problem with regards to how
Kenya’s water resources, supply and services should be managed, developed and
regulated?
b) What tensions and conflicts have the Act generated in Kenya’s water sector?
2
 Council of Governors (CoG) is a group that represents heads of the county (local) governments in Kenya 
3 
2 Background 
2.1 Reforms in Kenya’s Water Sector from 1963-2002 
To explore what the 2016 Water Act represents as the major problem as well as the tensions and 
conflicts that have emerged from the launch and implementation of the new Water Act, one has 
to understand the historical background of water laws in Kenya and the underpinning arguments 
behind them. When Kenya became independent in 1963, its water sector policy was focused on 
channelling water resources to communities which had not received support during British rule. 
This was done in the spirit of Harambee (i.e., pooling resources together for the country’s social 
and economic development) (Ogendi, Ong ’oa and Ong ’, 2009). Despite the good intention of 
the Government, this effort was not enough due to limited financial resources and lack of a 
skilled workforce in local communities (ibid). 
The current institutional framework for water management can be traced back to 1974 when the 
Government rolled out the National Water Master Plan (NWMP) to ensure the provision of 
potable water to all households by 2000 (ibid). However, due to a number of factors such as 
budgetary constraints, rapid population growth and haphazard human settlements in the 1980s, 
demand for water outstripped supply (ibid). In order to meet the increased water demand, the 
Government started to hand over the water supply systems to local actors and the private sector. 
After consultations between the Government and other water sector stakeholders on how to 
transfer the water supply, a decision was reached to revise the NWMP. The consultations gave 
birth to the National Policy on Water Resources Management and Development (NPWRMD), 
which came into effect in 1999. 
In 2002 a new Water Act was launched with the aim of making it easier to invest in water-related 
infrastructure (Beyene and Luwesi, 2018). In the 2002 Act, the Ministry of Water and Irrigation 
(MWI) had the legal obligation of running Kenya’s water sector. Among the key responsibilities 
that fell under the Ministry’s mandate were sector coordination, monitoring and control, and 
policy formulation, amongst others. The responsibilities the Ministry was mandated to undertake 
fell under two umbrellas, one being water resources management and development and the other 
water services provision. According to Beyene and Luwesi (2018), the desired outcome from the 
separation of policy and regulation from service provision and water resources management was 
4 
to improve the mechanisms of accountability and transparency in the water and sanitation 
services and resources management subsectors. The 2002 Act also aimed to commercialize the 
Water and Sanitation Services (WSS) and to encourage the participation of different stakeholders 
in the management and decision-making processes in the water sector.  
In Section 3, the 2002 Act states that all the water resources are vested to the state, subject to any 
rights of the user granted by or under the Act. The 2002 Act introduced new institutions within 
the WSS, including the Water Services Regulatory Board (WASREB or WSRB), mandated to 
set standards, monitor and enforce water services standards for the subsector; the Water Appeal 
Board (WAB), designated to solve disputes concerning water resources or water services.  Thus 
the 2002 Act as a consequence of this established Eight water services boards
3
 (WSBs -
responsible for the efficient and economical provision of water services, the Water Services 
Trust Fund (WSTF - formed to finance pro-poor investments; and water services providers 
(WSPs - licensed as agents for the provision of water and sewerage services. Figure 2.1 shows 
the institutional structure of the water sector under the Water Act from 2002. 
Figure 2.1 Legal and institutional set-up of the 2002 water sector reforms in Kenya (Beyene and Luwesi, 2018). 
Copyright by the Nordic Africa Institute (2018) 
3
 The political governance in the former constitution of Kenya consisted of one central national government and 
eight regional governments 
5 
When Kenya changed its Constitution in 2010, the Government saw a need to update and change 
the 2002 Water Act (ibid). In April 2014, the 2014 Water Bill
4
 was introduced in the National
Assembly, giving leeway for involved stakeholders to submit their memoranda, which 
highlighted differences in perspectives on what the Bill should contain (Construction Review 
Online, 2016). 
July 2014 marked the end of consultative meetings between the Nairobi City Council Assembly 
Water and Sanitation Sectoral Committee and several civil society organisations such as 
Hakijamii (Economic and Social Rights Centre) during which a joint memorandum was signed, 
paving the way for the 2014 Water Bill to replace the 2002 Water Act (StandardDigital, 2014). 
In April 2016, Parliament enacted the Bill which was approved in September 2016 by President 
Uhuru Kenyatta (Construction Review Online, 2016). The 2014 Water Bill was gazetted as a law 
(2016 Water Act) in October 2016.  
3 Method of Data Collection 
In addition to analysing the Water Act, I have explored a summary report from the 2030 Water 
Resources Group
5
  titled Understanding the Water Act 2016.  It was selected because of its
contribution to the improvement of the understanding of the problematization(s) of Kenya’s 2016 
Water Act. To support the evidence found in the Water Act and the summary report, I have also 
examined the Civil Society Organisation Annual Water and Sanitation Performance Report of 
the Financial Year 2015/2016 released in February 2017.  
In order to explore the tensions and conflicts that have emerged from the launch and 
implementation of the Water Act 2016, I have selected a website article from the Consumers 
Federation of Kenya (COFEK)
6
 entitled Why the water Bill 2014 is generating boiling point
temperatures as stakeholders jostle to either retain or drop the watered down final draft. The 
article discusses the perspectives of a group who claim to represent consumers’ interests in 
4
 A bill refers to a written document containing a proposal for a new law. 
5
 2030 WRG is a public-private-civil society collaboration hosted by the World Bank since 2012. 
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Kenya. I chose the article from COFEK due to its potential to establish a rich picture of 
contentious issues emerging from the launch of the Water Act of 2016.  
In addition I have also examined an article from the Water Integrity Network
7
 titled, “New Law
is Changing Power Dynamics and Governance Hot Spots in the Kenyan Water Sector” (Water 
Integrity Network, 2017). The article contributes contextual understandings of how the 
relationships amongst actors were a few months after the Act was launched. The article was 
written by the network as part of the proceedings of Kenya’s water sector annual conference in 
November 2016.  
In order to situate the Act in broader debates, I have also analysed Kenyan media articles, e.g., 
Proposed water law to give residents relief (StandardDigital, 2014), Governors challenge 
implementation of Water Act in Kenya (Construction Review Online, 2016), CoG says water bill 
ignored their views (The Star, 2015), and Citizen sues to stop implementation of new Water Act 
(TheStar, 2017). 
The media articles were an important source of information as they provided an overview of 
different positions taken by stakeholders about the new Water Act and the tensions and 
conflicting discourses surrounding it. I have purposefully selected media articles that highlight 
the tensions and conflicts surrounding the new 2016 Water Act, based on the expectation of their 
contribution to the improved understanding of the problematization(s) of the Kenyan 2016 Water 
Act. 
In addition to analysing the Act, the 2030 Water Resources Group summary report, the CSO 
annual report, the website articles by COFEK and Water Integrity Network and variuous media 
articles, I have collected secondary data from different sources such as literature on opportunities 
and challenges for devolving Kenya’s water sector. This has made it possible to create a rich 
picture and to triangulate various sources of information.  Collection of secondary data from 
different sources has also helped me to explore cases of contradictions in the different sources.  
I have made comparisons between statements from the Act, the summary report from the 2030 
Water Resources Group, the Constitution of Kenya and media debates surrounding the new 
7 
Water Act. The comparisons were made in order to analyse problematisation(s) in Kenya’s 
Water Act along with exploring the tensions and conflicts that have emerged in relation to its 
launch and implementation. In order to enhance the validity of this study, I used other online 
resources such as documents and media statements related to or describing the 2016 Water Act 
before and after it was launched. This has helped me to contextualize the Water Act from a 
historic point of view. 
4 Theoretical and analytical framework of the study 
In order to analyse what the 2016 Water Act represents as the major problem as to how Kenya’s 
water resources should be managed this thesis draws on the What’s the Problem Represented to 
Be? (WPR) approach and discourse. The WPR approach was developed by Carol Bacchi, a 
professor of political science at the University of Adelaide, Australia. The WPR approach 
contains a series of analytical phases for understanding policy as a means of exploring 
governmentality and governance. This study is framed within the field of policy studies that 
study how policy discourses regulate knowledge of the world and our shared understandings of 
events and social relations.  
It is commonly agreed that policies are made up of government processes, for example, laws, 
policy statements, programs and statements of principle (Du, 2016). However, the specific roles 
and functions of policies are still debated. The two main lines of thought are that policies shape 
and regulate the conditions of our entire existence, because they have become entrenched in the 
organisation of human affairs (Shore and Wright, 2003), whilst others maintain that policies 
focus on the ideals and actions the government is dedicated to achieve (Fawcett et al., 2010) and 
thus are not entrenched in current human affairs, but instead in political goals/ambition. Some 
even contend that policies are fundamentally political and that their ostensible 
purposes are merely to unite means and ends, in other words, to bridge a gap between goals and 
their execution (Wedel et al.,2016). Parsons (1992, p. 16) claims that although some readers 
might think that policies are expressed as neutral ideas, the language and rhetoric of “policy” are 
in fact the main instruments of political rationality.  
8 
The standard way of thinking and the dominant intellectual paradigm about policy is that policies 
focus on problem-solving. The majority of policy analysis frameworks focus on the role of 
policy in addressing social problems. However, if one considers a different approach, WPR can 
offer a means to explore policy as knowledge across which populations are governed and how 
within policies social problems are characterized. Thus, in order to address the first research 
question concerning what the 2016 Water Act represents as the major problem as to how 
Kenya’s water resources should be managed, this thesis will draw on Bacchi’s (2009) WPR 
approach.  
The WPR approach is a Foucauldian-inspired approach that relies upon post-structural premises; 
more specifically it focuses on policy as a means of exploring governmentality and governance 
(Bacchi, 2009).  The term governmentality here refers to set boundaries to the conducts of 
individuals whereas governance refers to any act that ultimately aims at shaping the conduct of 
individuals (Bacchi and Goodwin, 2016).   
Bacchi stresses that we need to “question” claimed intentions and purposes put forward by 
formulated policy proposals in order to reveal what is problematised and unproblematized in 
policy texts (ibid). By focusing on problematisations, the WPR approach opens up for 
identifying implied “problems” and bringing to light the role of policies in formulating social 
problems rather than just addressing them. 
The WPR approach rests upon a simple idea: what we propose to do about something reveals 
what we think needs to change and hence what we think is the “problem”8 or problematic
(Bacchi, 2013). In this context “think” is to be understood as a practice (Bacchi, 2009). To 
illustrate, Bacchi offers a real-life example of the idea on which the WPR approach rests. 
Assume you are an owner of a gymnasium and your water bills are skyrocketing. If you call in a 
plumber, you are saying what you think is problematic has something to do with leaking pipes. If 
in contrast, you decide to install water timers on the showers so that they cut off the water after 
three minutes, you are saying that what you think is problematic is overuse by your members. 
8
 In the WPR approach and in this study, the term “problem” refers to the kind of change implied in a particular 
policy proposal (ibid). Policy proposals at times state explicitly the kind of “problem” they aim to address; however, 
This is not always the case (Bacchi, 2009). The WPR approach intervenes at the point when the problem is not 
explicit to try and make concealed “problems” visible. 
9 
This simple idea – that what you propose to change reveals what you consider problematic – is 
the foundation of the WPR approach. 
The WPR approach argues that one can understand how the problem is represented by examining 
the proposed solution (ibid). This study will refer to “how the problem is represented” as 
“problem representation”. Representation means that something or someone is represented by 
proxy when one is not physically present (Phillips, 2002, p. 45). For instance, all citizens cannot 
be present in Parliament to discuss political issues, and that is why representative democracy is 
practical. In Bacchi’s WPR approach and this study, problem representation is defined as a way 
in which a particular policy “problem” is constituted9 in real life.
A key argument in the WPR approach is also that policy proposals can be seen as 
problematisations because they propose a change (Bacchi, 2009). Since policy proposals propose 
change, solutions will always be directed towards a particular “problem” that has been identified 
to be changed (ibid). For example, Bacchi argues that if training courses are offered to women as 
part of a policy to increase their representation in better-paying occupations, then the “problem” 
is represented to be women’s lack of training. 
As a guiding framework that aims at serving the researcher through the WPR approach, Bacchi 
(2009) lists six questions that probe how “problems” are represented in policies. They are: 
1. What’s the problem represented to be in a specific policy or policies?
2. What deep-seated presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation of
the “problem”?
3. How has this representation of the problem come about?
4. What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the
silences? Can the problem be thought about differently?
5. What effects are produced by this representation of the “problem”?
6. How/where has this representation of the “problem” been produced, disseminated
and defended? How could it be questioned, disrupted and replaced?
9
 The term constituted means that things have come into existence without deliberate intent through interactions or 
via practices (ibid). 
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The analysis of what the Act represents as the major problem as to how Kenya’s water resources 
should be managed will draw inspiration from the above questions from the WPR approach. This 
study will use the three first questions from the WPR approach as guiding questions to address 
what the Act represents as the major problem as to how Kenya’s water resources should be 
managed: (i) what is the problem represented to be in the Act? (ii) What assumptions underlie 
the specific problem addressed in the Act? and (iii) How has the representation of the problem 
identified come about?   
In order to examine the proposed change in Kenya’s water sector suggested by the 2016 Water 
Act, as well as the character and causes of the “problem” in the sector, I will draw on Michel 
Foucault’s use of the concept of “problematisation” and how it is interpreted by Bacchi 
(2009). Bacchi’s WPR approach draws on Foucault’s work, especially on his understanding 
of “problematisation” and his inclination to think problematically. The commonsense 
understanding of the term problematisation is how something is put forward (represented) to 
be a problem (Bacchi, 2009). 
Bacchi (2009, p. 263) suggests that to identify how a certain “policy problem” is constructed we 
need to examine the proposed change suggested by the policy. A proposed policy change 
highlights what policies “think” the problem is. Since policies, such as the 2016 Water Act 
specify what needs to be changed, they in themselves can be seen as forms of problematisation 
as they contain implicit representation of the character and causes of “problems”. The aim of the 
WPR framework is to “make politics visible” (ibid), and thus to uncover how governments 
engage in problematizing activity. 
In this thesis, I will draw on Bacchi’s work to explore governmental practices occurring with the 
2016 Water Act and to uncover the implicit assumptions behind their problematisations. 
Bacchi’s WPR approach recommends “working backwards” from concrete policies, programs 
and policy proposals to reveal what is represented and defined to be the “problem” within them. 
This means that it is possible to read backwards from any policy proposal—from the solution 
offered—what the  “problems” is understood—represented—to be in the policy proposal (ibid). 
It is further suggested that the work of the analyst begins with texts (Goodwin, 2011, p. 171). For 
example, I have explored the 2010 Constitution of Kenya because it entails a set of fundamental 
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principles or precedents on how Kenya is governed. The 2016 Kenyan Water Act was 
established according to the broad guidelines given by the Constitution. 
In analysing the data, I took note of the frequency with which certain issues in the study were 
being mentioned or expressed in the different texts. I clustered the data into themes, e.g., 
devolution, accountability and capacity in the context of managing administrative 
responsibilities.  
 
4.1.1 Governmentality 
To explore how the problem identified through the concept of problematisation (described 
earlier) sets boundaries and shapes the conducts of individuals, I will draw on Foucault’s concept 
of governmentality and how it is interpreted by Mitchell Dean (2009) and Bacchi (2009). In a 
general sense, according to Bacchi the term “governmentality” refers to kinds of thinking 
associated with particular approaches to governing, e.g. neoliberal, social or authoritarian. 
Thinking in this context is assumed to be systematic as well as a collective activity which is a 
representation of knowledge, belief and opinion in which people are immersed.  
Foucault defines governmentality as the “conduct of conduct” which refers to how the discourse 
and implementation of policies frame and create specific forms of interpretations, actions and 
interactions (Dean, 2009, p. 17). It is further suggested that studies of governmentality mainly 
have an interest in how thoughts operate within organized ways of doing things. 
The theory of governmentality will be used in the analysis to highlight how different 
assumptions accompanying the 2016 Water Act frame and form the actions of stakeholders 
within Kenya’s water sector and among Kenyan citizens. For instance, in the analysis section of 
this thesis study I explore underlying assumptions that offer conceptual logic that justifies the 
Constitution and thus the proposed change in Kenya’s water sector suggested by the 2016 
Water Act.  
The aim of inquiry will focus on how governing takes place in Kenya’s water sector through the 
problematisation process (ibid). Thus at a deeper level, the emphasis will be directed towards 
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how actions of stakeholders within Kenya’s water sector are guided as a result of the 
problematizing activity.  
 
4.2 The concept of discourse  
In order to explore the different understandings, debates, meanings and practices spurred by the 
tensions and conflicts surrounding the launch of the 2016 Water Act, as well as contradictions in 
the problem representation identified in the Act, this study draws on discourse analysis.  
Bacchi (2009, p.35) defines discourse as: 
…socially produced forms of knowledge that set limits on what is possible to 
think, write or speak about a given social object or practice. 
Bacchi’s point is that discourses set limits on what is possible to say or think about the objects 
they create, though they can and do contain tensions and contradictions that open up spaces for 
challenge and change. Discourse can be seen as an assemblage of statements, signs and 
practices that create objects and domains they aim to describe, giving these (objects and 
domains) status as “truth” or “knowledge”(Bacchi and Goodwin, 2016). 
Discourses, thus can be seen as powerful fictions that are commonly accepted as truths (ibid). 
For example, the way proper sanitation, clean water, water permits or flood mitigation are 
spoken about creates them as forms of social knowledge that make it difficult to speak outside of 
the context they establish for thinking about people and social relations. However, in this 
production of normativity there is exclusion of other information. In other words, Bacchi 
suggests that “things could be otherwise” (Bacchi and Goodwin, 2016). Thus, the process of 
discourse production involves governance (ibid), hence governing occurs through 
problematisation (Bacchi, 2009, Bacchi and Goodwin, 2016). Therefore the way in which 
problems are represented has a huge influence on how people conduct their lives. 
The concept of discourse will be used in the analysis to map out the processes where struggles 
are taking place and to reveal how certain meanings of keywords become so conventionalised 
(“fixed”) that they are thought of as natural (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002). For instance, this 
study explores what local management of water resources entails amongst different stakeholders 
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and how it should be practiced. Thus, the analysis will concentrate mainly on factors that are 
being given “greater voice” in the Act and the surrounding debates.  
 
 
5 Findings and Discussions from the study 
This chapter is structured in the following way. Firstly, I analyse problematization in Kenya’s 
Water Act 2016. Secondly, I describe the tensions and conflicts that have emerged from the 
launch and implementation of the Water Act 2016.  
 
5.1.1   What is the problem represented to be in the Act?  
In this thesis writing I argue that the whole 2016 Water Act is framed within devolution. To 
explore what the representation of the problem in the 2016 Water Act, I begin with what the Act 
proposes to change. Following Bacchi’s suggestion of “working backwards”, I consider what 
solutions are proposed to understand where the problem is thought to be and what needs to be 
changed (Bacchi, 2009; Bacchi and Goodwin, 2016; Pumpo, 2018). As mentioned earlier, the 
word  “think” here is thought of as a practice (Bacchi, 2009, 2012, 2017). The aim of this inquiry 
is to find an “entry point” (Bacchi, 2009; Bacchi and Goodwin, 2016; Pumpo, 2018), a window 
on the implicit assumptions that lie behind a defined problem representation. This opening on the 
problematisation is constituted by the solutions (ibid). Instead of “solutions” and “problems”, 
Rose (2000) talks about “answers” and “questions”. In this context, it would be “What is the 
2016 Water Act an answer to?” That is, what set of questions produces the Water Act as an 
intelligible answer. 
As mentioned earlier, in 2010 when Kenya changed its Constitution (which came into effect in 
2013), water supply and sanitation services were declared as basic rights and the provision of  
these services was assigned to the 47 newly established county governments (also established by 
the new Constitution) (Patrick and Heymans, 2015). According to Patrick and Heymans (2015), 
the new Constitution provides a unique opportunity to shift the water and sanitation sector to 
new scales of improved efficiency in service delivery. All counties were mandated to extend 
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their water networks to increase service coverage, reduce non-revenue water
10
 and water losses, 
and increase production capacity and cash collection efficiency. However, these concrete 
upgrades in service delivery were not to be achieved through growth in investment alone; key 
parties at the county and national levels were to undertake major reforms on the systems and 
practices within the water sector. In other words all responsible parties at the county and national 
levels would have to work smart to improve their economic and institutional framework for 
water utilities and to enhance the enabling environment for attracting sources of finance and 
reducing investment needs. 
The Transition Authority, a statutory body with the authority from the new Constitution was 
assigned the task to facilitate the transition process in the devolution of water service networks 
and in the undertaking of the major reforms in the water sector. According to Patrick and 
Heymans (2015) this transfer of responsibilities to county governments meant that the policy role 
of national government with respect to water and sanitation services required a level of 
cooperative governance and consultation with counties which was not the case in the previous 
governance structure. New legislature which was sector-specific was to be introduced within the 
water sector, this legislature would allow counties to work with the national government to 
sustain existing services and to ensure a smooth transition as the legislative framework for the 
sector was formalized, and new institutions settled in. Thus the 2014 Water Bill (which was later 
enacted as the 2016 Water Act) was introduced before parliament and stakeholders such as the 
Nairobi City Council Assembly Water and Sanitation Sectoral Committee and several civil 
society organisations such as Hakijamii where able to submit their memoranda on what the 2014 
Water Bill should contain. 
In July 2014 a consultative meeting between the Nairobi City Council Assembly Water 
Sanitation Sectoral Committee and stakeholders such as the civil society organizations within the 
water sector on the new legislature that would ensure the smooth transition of the legislative 
framework in the water sector came to a closure, with the signing of a joint memorandum to 
replace the 2002 Water Act (the existing law at the time). The signing of the joint memorandum 
                                                 
10
 Water that does not generate revenue. Examples can include water that is lost through leaks, illegal connections, 
or water that is not paid for by customers because they did not receive a bill or have not paid. (Patrick and Heymans, 
2015,p.12)  
15 
paved the way for the 2014 Water Bill (once assented into law) to provide the legislative 
framework in the water sector after the ascension of the new Constitution in 2010. In April 2016, 
the National Assembly enacted the Bill which was later approved into law in September 2016 by 
President Uhuru Kenyatta. The Bill was gazetted as a law (2016 Water Act) in October 2016. 
The 2016 Water Act states its purpose as: 
… to provide for the regulation, management and development of water 
resources, water and sewerage services; and for other connected purposes
11
The Act does not directly state the specific problem(s) it aims to address with regards to 
management, development and regulation of Kenya’s water resources and services. However, 
when analysing the Act, it becomes clear that it focuses on the problem of incoherence in the 
administration of water resources and services, which becomes particularly salient when 
analyzing Section 77 of the Act. 
In Section 77, the Act provides the county governments with the mandate to provide water and 
sanitation services as well as to develop the county waterworks. To exercise this mandate, the 
county governments are instructed to establish Water Services Providers, which are supposed to 
be commercially managed and licensed by the Water Services Regulatory Board (WASREB). 
The Act states: 
(1) A county government shall establish water services providers.
(2) In establishing a water services provider, a county government shall
comply with the standards of commercial viability set out by the Regulatory 
Board. 
Furthermore, in Section 68, the Act provides for the establishment of the Water Works 
Development Agencies (WWDA)
12 
whose primary responsibility is to develop “national public
works” assets (water assets of national and strategic importance and cross-county water assets) 
that should be later handed over to the Water Service Providers managed by the county 
11
 Kenta Gazette Supplement No. 164 (Acts No.43) Republic of Kenya p. 1026 
12
 These agencies of the national government are also called Water Works Development Bodies whose primary aim 
is the development of national public works. 
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governments. These assets include water storage and water works for bulk distribution of water 
services. According to the Act the WWDA are also supposed to: provide technical services and 
capacity building to such county governments and water services providers within its area as 
may be requested. 
The Act also states that: 
All property, assets, rights, liabilities, obligations, agreements and other 
arrangements linked to water service provision existing at the commencement 
of this Act and vested in, acquired, incurred or entered into by or on behalf of 
the water services boards and the National Water Conservation and Pipeline 
Corporation shall, upon commencement of this Act, be deemed to have vested 
in or to have been acquired, incurred or entered into by or on behalf the 
county water services providers or cross-county water services providers  
(Part IX, Section 154, Water Act 2016) 
As understood from the above quote all functions of “national public works” assets, agreements 
and arrangements related to water services provision are being transferred to the county water 
services providers or cross-county water services providers. The act aims to reorganise the whole 
water sector into the devolved structure. 
The 2016 Water Act essentially proposes that there should be a change in how water resources 
and services are managed. This means that it specifies what needs to change in Kenya’s water 
sector as well as the character and causes of the “problem” in the sector. The 2016 Water Act 
implicitly suggests that there is a “problem” of incoherence with regards to water administration 
between national and county governments which needs to be fixed. Therefore, incoherence 
between functions of the national and county governments is “made to be a problem”. 
Viewing the 2016 Water Act through problematisation creates a particular understanding of what 
the “problem” is. The incoherence between the national government and county governments in 
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the water sector administration emerges as a challenge, a problem that requires a solution.  A 
Similar conclusion has also been made by the 2030 Water Resources Group
13
 who state that: 
The purpose of the 2016 Water Act is to align the water sector with the 
Constitution’s primary objective of devolution. 
A similar conclusion is also forwarded by the civil society organisation annual report released in 
collaboration with Hakijamii (Economic and Social Rights Centre)
14
. The report states that: 
The signing of the new Water Act in 2016 was a landmark for Kenya’s water 
sector. The Act aligns water governance to the devolved structure of 
government established by the Constitution of Kenya 2010 and introduces 
several important changes to the institutional landscape.
15
 
Both the 2030 Water Resources Group and the CSO group Hakijamii (Economic and Social 
Rights Centre) state that the purpose of the 2016 Water Act is to align the water sector with the 
Constitution’s primary objective of devolution. The 2016 Water Act has the primary 
responsibilities of transferring functions, “national public works” assets (such as water storage 
and water works for the bulk distribution of water services), agreements and arrangements 
related to water services provision from the national government to the decentralized county 
water services providers. In this context, incoherence between the national and county 
governments, was accepted as normal and viewed as a challenge needing a solution.Thus, it is 
problematized. However, by framing that there is naturalization of incoherence between the 
national and county governments as a problem, I am not implying that the responsible 
institutions (Water Ministry) whilst drafting the 2016 Water Act intentionally manipulated the 
version of the  “problems”, but on the contrary,  “problems” come into existence without 
deliberate intent through  the simple act of making policy (Bacchi, 2009). In other words, the 
“problems” are constituted in the simple act of making policy. 
                                                 
13
 2030 WRG is a public-private-civil society collaboration hosted by the World Bank since 2012. 
14
 Hakijamii (Economic and Social Rights Centre) is one of the stakeholders involved in signing the joint 
memorandum to repeal the former law (2002 Water Act) and enact the new 2016 Water Act. 
15
 KAWASNET, 2017, p. 11 
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In Section 15 of Chapter 18, the Constitution discusses the provisions for devolution to be 
developed when the Constitution is fully implemented, stating: 
15. Provision for devolution of functions to be made by Act of Parliament  
(1) Parliament shall, by legislation, make provision for the phased transfer, 
over a period of not more than three years from the date of the first election of 
county assemblies, from the national government to county governments of the 
functions assigned to them under Article 185. 
(2) The legislation referred to in subsection (1) shall—  
(a) provide for the way in which the national government shall— (i) facilitate 
the devolution of power; (ii) assist county governments in building their 
capacity to govern effectively and provide the services for which they are 
responsible; and (iii) support county governments; 
(b) establish criteria that must be met before particular functions are devolved 
to county governments to ensure that those governments are not given 
functions which they cannot perform; 
(c) permit the asymmetrical devolution of powers to ensure that functions are 
devolved promptly to counties that have the capacity to perform them but that 
no county is given functions it cannot perform; and 
In this Chapter, a timeframe of three years from the date of the first election of county assemblies 
(first elections held in March 2013) is given for Parliament to provide a legislative framework 
for a gradual transfer of functions and services to the county governments. It is suggested that 
through legislative framework the national government shall allow for devolution of powers so 
as to make county governments independent and self-governing. 
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5.1.2 What assumptions underlie the specific problem addressed in the 
Act?  
According to Bacchi (2009, p. 263) policies create representations of “problems” that take lives 
of their own because they affect materially and symbolically how people are governed and how 
we live. To put it in another way, Bacchi is saying that since people are governed through 
problematisations, they can be seen as framing mechanisms that determine what is considered to 
be significant and what is left out of consideration (Bacchi, 2009). In the context of this research 
I argue that incoherence between the national and county governments is framed as a “problem” 
that needs fixing, hence by this framing the Act determines what is considered significant. 
The 2016 Water Act is engaged in governance, that is, the Act guide individual behavior in a 
desired direction. This means that as a result of the problematizing activity of incoherence 
between the national and county governments in the 2016 Water Act, individual conduct is 
implicitly and indirectly steered in a specific direction. In fact, the ultimate goal of governing as 
mentioned earlier is to change how people act and in this process governmentalities set 
boundaries on the conduct of individuals. 
Chapter 11 of the Constitution of Kenya from 2010 casts light on the background knowledges, 
thinking and assumptions that exist behind the different forms of rule (governmental 
rationalities). In Section 174 the Constitution states: 
 
The objects of the devolution of government are—  
(a) to promote democratic and accountable exercise of power; (b) to foster 
national unity by recognising diversity;(c) to give powers of self-governance to 
the people and enhance the participation of the people in the exercise of the 
powers of the State and in making decisions affecting them;(d) to recognise the 
right of communities to manage their own affairs and to further their 
development;(e) to protect and promote the interests and rights of minorities 
and marginalised communities;(f) to promote social and economic 
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development and the provision of proximate, easily accessible services 
throughout Kenya;(g) to ensure equitable sharing of national and local 
resources throughout Kenya;(h) to facilitate the decentralisation of State 
organs, their functions and services, from the capital of Kenya; and (i) to 
enhance checks and balances and the separation of powers. 
 
The above objectives on devolution can be seen as underlying assumptions that offer a 
conceptual logic
16
 that justifies the provision of “devolution” in the Constitution and hence the 
2016 Water Act. The objectives can be seen as forms of governmentalitis as they aim to foster 
democracy and national diversity, enhanced participation of Kenyan citizens in governance, and 
promote the rights and interests of marginalized communities, among other things.  
A similar conclusion can be drawn when examining the perspectives of the Consumers 
Federation of Kenya (COFEK)
17
 on the impact of the 2016 Water Act on to Kenya’s water 
sector. They write: 
Devolution is an opportunity to deepen and expand on implementation of the 
rights to water and sanitation by the creation of a better legislation at national 
and county level which clarifies the minimum national standards in water and 
sanitation services and also provides a coherent linkage between the two levels 
of government to ensure coordinated implementation of the rights and 
enforcement measures on performance against the water service providers and 
third parties.  
 
COFEK see devolution as a platform for greater engagement and participation in exercising the 
powers of the State and in making decisions affecting Kenyan consumers along the two tiers of 
                                                 
16
 Conceptual logic refers to meanings that exist in a particular problem representation for it to make sense (Bacchi, 
2009). 
17
 The Consumers Federation of Kenya (COFEK) is Kenya’s independent, self-funded, multi-sectorial, non-political 
and apex non-profit federation committed to consumer protection, education, research, consultancy, litigation, anti-
counterfeit campaigns and business rating on consumerism and customer-care issues. 
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governance (national and local). With greater engagement and participation, the anticipated 
outcomes according to COFEK are an equitable distribution of water resources and services to 
Kenyan consumers. The above mentioned propositions reveal a number of assumptions: firstly, 
that the change in approach in developing countries advocated by donors and international 
NGOs, “devolution” has resulted in determining the structure of Kenya’s water sector future; 
secondly, that transfer of responsibility (i.e.,“ devolution” ) of provision of water supply and 
sanitation services to county governments was considered an upgrade to service delivery; and 
thirdly, that  “devolution” ended up being considered fundamental to development in Kenya’s 
water sector future. These assumptions have become so commonplace that it is difficult to think 
outside them. This is in line with Bacchi’s (2009) suggestion that problematisations are framing 
mechanisms that determine what is considered significant, and thus they limit awareness to a 
wide range of conditions that make up our existence. 
A demonstration of these framing mechanisms can be examined by exploring the establishment 
of WWDA within the 2016 Water Act. The findings in this study reveal that through the 2016 
Water Act, the national government established the WWDA to gradually create and develop 
“national public works” assets (such as water storage and water works for the bulk distribution of 
water services) and then later hand the assets developed to the water service providers located at 
county or cross-county levels. The position that WWDA is given in the 2016 Water Act is 
important for governing, because ultimately the assets belong to the national government and it 
decides on the creation and development of assets in Kenya’s water sector. Under this 
framework the county and the cross-county water services providers end up being executors.  
The WWDAs are responsible for the operation of the public water works, until the responsibility 
for the operation, rehabilitation and maintenance of the water works is handed over to the county 
government when they prove that county governments are capable to undertake the 
responsibility. The 2016 Water Act states in Section 69(3) that in the event that the county 
government defaults in the maintenance of the public water works, the WWDA can petition the 
Regulatory Board (WASREB) to declare a default and order back the transfer of the water 
services provider’s functions to the WWDA. This is a form of governing that entails the 
exercising of power by using withdrawal of functions from local actors as a form of threat or 
punishment. Another illustration can be seen in Section 106 where the Act states that it shall be 
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the duty of every county government executive to monitor and enforce the applicable regulations 
made under the Act, and any county government executive who fails to do so shall be liable to an 
order by the Regulatory Board (WASREB) to take such action to enforce such regulations as 
shall be specified in the order. 
A key element in governing of the water services providers at the county and cross-county levels 
is that WWDA decides on development, maintenance and management of the public water 
works. However, the 2016 Water Act does not provide clear legislative linkages that would 
ensure the supervision of WWDAs’ water development works (COFEK, 2014). Frustration has 
been expressed by COFEK over lack of clear legislative linkages between the WWDA and a 
regulatory body (WASREB) that approves tariffs, and monitors and enforces water services 
standards (ibid). COFEK feared that the work of WWDA will affect to a great extent the 
replacement and provision of new “national public works” assets (such as water storage and 
water works for the bulk distribution of water services). More specifically, their concern is 
towards the transfer of accountability from the person who develops assets to the one who 
operates them. COFEK feared that in case there is no monitoring or supervision of the assets that 
are being developed, there is a risk of developing poor quality of assets which will invariably 
drive up the cost of providing water services as they will have to be repaired. The costs of these 
repairs and replacement may have to be generated from consumers or taxpayers in the form of 
water tariffs. 
Under the new 2016 Water Act, WSPs must apply again for new licenses to WASREB. 
However, it is the responsibility of county governments who have the mandate to provide water 
services (2030 WRG, 2016). County and cross-county water services providers can also be said 
to have a strong influence on provision of water and sanitation services. However, national 
institutions such as WWDA and WASREB have a majority influence on regulation and policy 
formulation. County and cross-county water services providers are more linked to consumption, 
use and water services provision.  
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5.1.3  How has the representation of the problem identified come about?   
A way forward after revealing the background knowledges, thinking and assumptions that exist 
behind the different governmental rationalities within the 2016 Water Act and the different 
underlying arguments that exist to justify the governmental rationalities is to identify key 
practices underpinning these assumptions and to trace their origins (Bacchi, 2009). This study 
reveals that the central focus in debates from Kenya’s water sector is on devolution and how it 
should be designed to optimally reward the Kenyan population with its associated benefits.  
According to Ribot (2002), while the decentralisation “discourse” (transfer of powers to actors 
and institutions at local levels) has rarely been translated into law or practice, almost all 
developing countries are undertaking decentralisation reforms. It is further suggested that these 
changes in approach in developing countries have been advocated by donors and international 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) who may have varying motives, seeing decentralisation 
as a means for increasing access, use, management, voice and claims over natural resources. 
However, according to Larson and Soto (2008, p. 218), the evidence from numerous case studies 
carried out on decentralization in resource governance contexts reveal that the benefits associated 
with devolution have often been elusive to achieve, because the institutional changes are rarely 
achieved in practice. Similar views are shared by Ribot (2002), who states that the potential 
benefits of decentralisation remain unrealized because the government discourse has not resulted 
in the enactment of necessary laws, or where decentralisation laws do exist, they have not been 
implemented.  
As mentioned earlier, Bacchi and Goodwin (2016) state: “Following Foucault, discourses are 
understood as socially produced forms of knowledge that set limits upon what it is possible to 
think, write or speak” about a defined thing. Thus, an investigation of the articulation of the 
discourse of decentralisation and its effects within Kenyan society is among the purposes of this 
thesis. The question that arises then is why devolution is being promoted in Kenya’s water sector 
despite evidence in the literature which seems to disprove the decentralisation framework. 
According to Bird et al. (1998), attempting to define decentralisation as good or bad is 
unproductive and misleading because the impact of decentralisation depends on the design of the 
process. Bird et al. instead suggest that focus should be directed to the rules that influence the 
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behavior of actors at different levels of government, in the private sector, and in civil society 
during the decentralisation process.  
Along a similar line of discussion as Bird et al., Ribot (2002) suggests that decentralisation 
reforms are often accompanied by insufficient transfer of powers to local institutions and even 
these are often accompanied by tight supervision from the national government. This idea of 
tight supervision from the national government in decentralisation reforms lies behind the 
proposition by the new Act to establish the WWDA. The findings of this thesis study reveal that 
the national government established and empowered the WWDA to gradually create and develop 
assets (such as water storage and water works for the bulk distribution of water services) and to 
hand them to the water service providers located at county or cross-county levels. It is my 
interpretation that, due to the fear of inadequate accountability and capacity within the local 
governments, accompanied by some reluctance within the national government, the WWDA was 
established to gradually create and develop assets on behalf of local governments. The assets 
developed through the WWDA are later to be handed to the county governments when they have 
developed and proved their capacity to manage the assets. 
 
5.2 Tensions and conflicts surrounding the 2016 Water Act 
In order to explore the tensions and conflicts spurred by the launch of the 2016 Water Act, this 
study has focused on different arguments by stakeholders (such as the Council of Governors, 
COFEK, and the national media) in Kenya’s water sector. 
 
5.2.1 Struggles between competing discourses. 
As mentioned earlier, while the decentralisation “discourse” (transfer of powers to actors and 
institutions at local levels) has rarely been fully translated into law or practice, almost all 
developing countries are undertaking decentralisation reforms (Ribot, 2002). Decentralisation in 
developing countries has been advocated by donors and international NGOs who may have 
varying motives, such as a means for increasing access, use, management, voice and claims over 
natural resources (ibid). 
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When the 2014 Water Bill was introduced in the National Assembly, tensions and controversies 
emerged surrounding the Bill. These have continued even after the launch of the Act. Water 
Integrity Network
18
 (WIN) undertook observations from the annual sector conference and 
Kenya’s water week in November 2016, which took place two months after the 2014 Water Bill 
was assented into a law (2016 Water Act). WIN explained that the conference provided a perfect 
opportunity for stakeholders in the water sector to discuss their views on the Act. In addition, 
WIN stated that the conference was an essential step in bringing both the county and national 
government executives responsible for water to the table, but tensions remained high. 
Observations by WIN are evidence of existing tensions and controversies that existed before and 
after the launching of the 2016 Water Act. 
The criticisms towards the 2016 Water Act from the stakeholders in Kenya’s water sector can be 
summarized as follows. As compared to the 2002 Water Act, it (i) reversed legislative provisions 
for the management and development of water resources and services, (ii) focuses on many 
national institutions which could easily be merged or removed, (iii) low public participation in 
developing the new Act, and (iv) low-level emphasis on the devolution of water services as 
provided for by the Constitution of Kenya from 2010 (i.e., transfer of options such as power, 
functions, authority and resources from the central government to the county governments). 
Importantly, it should be noted that the different stakeholders had varying arguments and 
perspectives related to the 2016 Water Act.  
The Act opened up new spaces for the above mentioned stakeholders to make demands as well 
as foster expectations among local communities and governments in which they expressed their 
dissatisfaction and disappointment with the manner in which the Act provided legislation for 
devolution. A common feature from the critics of the new Act was that it maintained decision-
making and use of power at the national government level while devolving the task of water 
services provision to the local governments (COFEK, 2014; TheStar, 2015, 2017).  
                                                 
18
 The Water Integrity Network (WIN) supports and connects an open network of partner individuals, organizations, 
and governments  promoting water integrity to reduce corruption and improve water sector performance worldwide. 
WIN was founded by IRC, SIWI, Swedish Water House, Transparency International and the World Bank Water and 
Sanitation Programme in 2006 to respond to increasing concerns among water and anti-corruption stakeholders 
regarding the impact of corruption in the water sector. Formerly an entity of Transparency International, 2014 saw 
WIN become an independent association (legally WIN e.V., or eingetragener Verein—registered association) 
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More specifically, the stakeholders expressed frustration towards the responsible offices for 
formulating the Water Act (Water Cabinet Secretary) and the responsible offices for legal 
adviser and representative of the government (Attorney General) for establishing the WWDA. 
Under the new Act, the WWDA will gradually create and develop “national public works” assets 
(such as water storage and water works for the bulk distribution of water services) and then later 
on hand the assets to the water service providers located at county or cross-county levels. The 
Act is presented by the Council of Governors, COFEK, some sections of the national media and 
a Kenyan citizen  as having the interest of the national government at heart (COFEK, 2014; 
StandardDigital, 2014; The Star, 2015, 2017; ConstructionReviewOnline, 2016). The Kenyan 
citizen (an environmental activist), also accused the new law of establishing illegitimate and 
uncertain duties (through establishment of WWDA) which they feared would result in waste of 
public funds (ConstructionReviewOnline, 2016; The Star, 2017).  
The following sub-sections presents more detailed arguments and debates from each of the four 
main stakeholders identified in this thesis study. 
 
a) Consumers Federation of Kenya (COFEK) 
COFEK wrote on their website that: 
The Water bill 2014 is causing silent ripples in the manner the water sector 
will be run even as the annual water sector stakeholders conference is called 
for March 27-28, 2014 in Nairobi (ibid). 
The above statement by COFEK was released leading up Kenya’s annual water sector 
stakeholders conference in March 2014 in Nairobi.  In addition, COFEK expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the manner in which the Bill was formulated, stating: 
… the Bill [Water Bill from 2014] does water down what exists in regulation 
and in governance and will not as currently drafted lead to an orderly sector. 
Some issues are poor draftsmanship, some issues are on clawback on what 
currently exists [former Water Act 2002] and some issues have been omitted 
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even though the sector has discussed them and are required under due to the 
fact that water and sanitation are human rights.  
 
The quote above reveals that COFEK warned about dangers of disorder in the water sector if the 
proposed legislation (2014 Water Bill) was going to be implemented the way it had been drafted. 
They accused the Bill of being of “low quality” and that their views were not taken into account 
in spite of a consultative meeting taking place. In some cases, COFEK accused the 2014 Water 
Bill of reversing the legislative provisions for the management and development of water 
resources and services under the 2002 Water Act. 
 
b) Council of Governors (CoG)   
As mentioned earlier, in April 2014 consultative meetings were underway and stakeholders were 
allowed to submit their memoranda on what the 2014 Water Bill should contain. The Council of 
Governors (the leaders of the county governments) gave a different account of the consultations 
that took place when developing the proposed legislation (2014 Water Bill). The CoG accused 
the Water Ministry of ignoring or not heeding their inputs on the Bill (The Star, 2015). Through 
their representative, the CoG stated that they had signed a memorandum of issues that they 
wished to amend in the Bill. However, they accused the Water Ministry of going ahead and 
submitting the Bill to the National Assembly without incorporating their input. Their 
representative released a media statement declaring that: 
“There are serious flaws in the bill. We had more than 12 meetings with the 
ministry but unfortunately they did not incorporate our proposals … It is 
unfortunate that and very mischievous of the ministry to disregard the views of 
the governors. We may have to do a complete overhaul of the bill.” 
In April 2016, the Parliament of Kenya enacted the Bill and in September 2016 when the Bill 
was assented into law, the CoG filed a court petition to stop the implementation of the new law 
(ConstructionReviewOnline, 2016). They sued the Water Cabinet Secretary (responsible officer 
in formulating policies and overseeing effective coordination of government operations) together 
28 
with the Attorney General (responsible offices for legal adviser and representative of the 
government, who promotes, protects and upholds the rule of law and defends public interest) 
(ibid). The CoG argued that the Act was “unconstitutional” as it excluded the county 
governments and sets up a centralized framework for regulation and provision of water and 
sanitation services (ibid). The Council also threatened to amend the Bill and make it better by 
incorporating their views. They feared that unless devolution efforts provided for in the 
Constitution are not adhered to, developmental challenges faced by many Kenyans may linger. 
In a media statement the Council’s Chief Executive, said that: 
“I earnestly believe that Kenyans will suffer irreparably if this Act is 
implemented because it seeks to effectively repeal several provisions of the 
Constitution through the backdoor.”        (Construction Review Online, 2016) 
The Council’s representative added that: 
… the constitution says that the national and the county governments be 
distinct and that they should run independently but conduct themselves with 
mutual cooperation … the previous centralised approach kind of government 
which ruled the country since 1897 to 2010 left many Kenyans without access 
to basic services and amenities … that previous governments resulted to 
marginalization and deep rooted socioeconomic as well as political problems 
… that is why devolution is the only way such ills of the past could be forgotten 
yet the enactment of the new Act appears to take Kenyans several steps 
backwards. 
While the CoG is probably right that the Water Ministry undermined the county governments 
and their leadership by going ahead and submitting the Bill to the National Assembly without 
incorporating their input, the CoG seems on more dubious ground when they claim that the 2016 
Water Act was “unconstitutional”. 
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When it comes to maintaining a centralized framework for regulation and provision of water as 
well as sanitation services, the CoG accused the 2016 Water Act of diverting funds that were 
meant for county governments to unnecessary multiple institutions at the national government’s 
level. My interpretation is that these allegations of diverting funds to unnecessary multiple 
institutions were aimed at the national government establishment of the WWDA. CoG stated that 
it would be suitable for the county governments to carry out the functions of monitoring, 
regulating licenses and enforcing license conditions: 
… the bill [Water Bill from 2014] disregarded the existence of the county 
governments … it has retained more responsibilities at the national 
government despite water services being devolved … functions of Water Works 
Agency [WWDA] which the bill is proposing to be established … the agency 
should not be mandated to monitor, regulate licences and enforce licence 
conditions ... the function is best performed by the county governments. 
 
The argument by the Council in the above quote is similar to the arguments by COFEK, and also 
the argument by the Council when the law was still a Bill before it was passed into an Act. Both 
the CoG and COFEK have the opinion that the establishment of multiple institutions (such as 
WWDA) were unsustainable and maintained a non-devolved decision-making framework.  
In addition, the Council also maintained the same argument as earlier: that county governments 
input were not heeded when the new law was developed. The media article describing the 
Council’s argument stated that: 
The council also claimed that the Water Act was enacted without consulting 
adequately the concerns raised by the regional governments; hence it is 
against the principal of unilateral access to clean, safe and adequate water 
provision. 
Both the CoG and COFEK critique seemed to be about sentiments of not being able to 
influence the drafting of the Water Bill 2014 (which was assented into law as the 2016 
Water Act). 
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c) A Kenyan citizen
In February 2017, four months after the Bill was assented into an Act, a Kenyan citizen (Mr. 
Martin Guya, an environmental activist) also moved to the Kenyan court to stop the 
implementation of the 2016 Water Act (The Star, 2017). The citizen accused the Act of giving 
only the national government the powers to decide water conservation and management 
methods. The citizen feared that the new law excluded the county governments from water 
management and this subdued devolution efforts. The citizen argued that environmental 
conservation, water provision and management should be done by both the national government 
and the decentralised county governments. In a media statement, the citizen expressed 
dissatisfaction with the new 2016 Water Act by stating that: 
The law threatens the realization of the obligation to protect and promote the 
right to water and sanitation. 
In addition, the citizen also accused the new law of establishing illegitimate and uncertain duties 
which the citizen feared would result in wastage of public funds. His statement is similar to the 
Council of Governor’s which claimed that the Act focuses on the national government and does 
not acknowledge the existence of county governments.  
d) The national media
In anticipation of the new law, Standard Media (one of Kenya’s national media groups) praised 
the 2016 Water Act for providing legislation in management of water resources aligned to the 
provisions by the Constitution of Kenya from 2010 (StandardDigital, 2014). Specifically the 
media group complimented the 2016 Water Act for providing legislation on the manner in which 
inspectors of the Water Resources Regulatory Authority can enter onto private land (ibid). It is 
suggested by the group that the new law required land owners to be given a reasonable verbal or 
written notice at a reasonable time before inspection. The media group stated that: 
Residents across the country are warming up to a new law that seeks to 
provide for management of the resource in line with the Constitution. Water 
and sanitation have been a nightmare especially in Nairobi where over 60 per 
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cent of residents live in informal settlements. However, there could be light at 
the end of the tunnel as the run-up to a new Water Act shifts to top gear as 
economic and social rights organisations strive to ensure equity. 
 
Another article produced by Standard Media was in contradiction to their earlier article as it 
raised concerns about the 2016 Water Act (Standard Media, 2015). The media group accused the 
2016 Water Act of maintaining a centralised decision-making framework (dominant national 
government) in management of water resources and provision of water services (ibid). Although 
the media group in this second article praised the new law for acknowledging the Kenya citizens’ 
rights to water, the group immediately accused the law for belittling the task of developing the 
standards for achieving the rights to water by assigning the Ministry of Water dual roles of being 
both a player and the referee in defining the degree of its obligations in achieving the rights to 
water for the Kenyan people. The StandardMedia (2015) statement read: 
One of the most glaring flaws in the proposed water law [2016 Water Act] is 
that while it recognises the citizens’ rights to water but omits sanitation, the 
function of developing the standards for the realisation of these rights will be 
undertaken by the ministry itself – essentially making the minister a referee 
and player in determining the extent of ministry’s own obligations to the public 
… A second flaw in the water bill is the centralisation of decision making 
system with an overly dominant national government in all apex bodies – the 
Water Resources Authority, the Water Harvesting Authority, the Water 
Services Regulatory Board and Water Works Boards which coordinate and 
control the resources and water services development. This governance 
approach does not allow for sufficient demand-side input during the key sector 
decisions… 
 
The debates surrounding the launch of the 2016 Water Act can be seen as a negotiated arena, 
where different discourses, tensions and controversies compete in regard to what kind of 
legislation should prevail and who should have the power to define these regulations. In  other 
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words, one can view the debates as multi-sided conversations among different stakeholders 
trying to persuade each other to agree or at least to take their position seriously (Graff and 
Birkenstein, 2010). In the midst of these struggles about the new Act, different meanings and 
practices emerge, such as shared understandings of what local management of water resources 
entails and how it should be practiced. Such debates from the Council of Governors, COFEK, the 
national media and the environmental activist contributed to the construction of discourses on 
“local water governance” that were of different kinds than those that were promoted in the Act 
from 2016 by the national government. The different understandings of (local or national) 
management of water resources can be seen as opposing and defining reality in different ways. 
This is in line with Laclau and Mouffe’s suggestion that no discourse can be fully established; it 
is always in conflict with other discourses that define reality differently and set other guidelines 
for social action (Phillips, 2002).   
The provision of regulation on management and development of Kenya’s water resources and 
services is accepted by almost all (if not all) stakeholders as a necessity. The conflict arises over 
the definition of what kind of legislation should prevail and who should have the power to define 
these regulations. These acceptances of provisions on regulation on management of water 
resources and services can be seen to correspond to Foucault’s concept of “discursive formation” 
(Phillips, 2002). Phillips (2002) defines the concept of “discursive formation” as a frame of 
different and potentially conflicting discourses that operate in the same social terrain. In the 
Kenya water sector context and current research the concept of “discursive formation”  is 
equivalent to the provision of regulation on management and development of Kenya’s water 
resources and services.  
Importantly, discourses can provide resources for making particular kinds of demands (Bacchi, 
2009). For example, the discourses on “local management” of water resources have drawn upon 
the narratives on decentralisation reforms which have been advocated in developing countries by 
donors and international NGOs to make important political claims for recognition. The court 
petitions to stop the implementation of the new law can be seen as resources provided by 
different discourses to make political claims for recognition and in some cases make specific 
demands. According to Patrick and Heymans (2015), under devolution a number of stakeholders 
at local government level such as the Council of Governors were not satisfied with the 
  
33 
 
assumption that assets should belong to the national government alone, and there has been a 
strong call for the transfer of assets to counties. 
The arguments and debates surrounding the development and the launch of the Act can be tied to 
the struggle of competing discourses trying to convince the Kenyan population on certain points 
of views concerning the superiority of national or of local management of water resources. 
COFEK and the Council of Governors as stakeholders have criticized the Act of ignoring key 
provisions from the Constitution of 2010 and even in some instances labelled the law as “poor 
draftsmanship”(COFEK, 2014).  Such statements from COFEK and the Council of Governors 
were aimed at questioning the national government’s potential to administer Kenya’s water 
resources while at the same time supporting the views that local governments were more suited 
to taking care of water resources and water services provision.  
 
 
6 Conclusions 
This thesis has analysed problematization in Kenya’s Water Act 2016 and discussed the tensions 
and conflicts spurred by the Act’s launch and implementation. The thesis reveals that the Act at 
the most basic level proposes that there has to be a change at the administrative level in how 
water resources and services are managed. The textual material analysed in this study shows that 
the Act was formulated to fulfil the constitutional provision for devolution. Thus this study 
argues that the Water Act implicitly suggests that there is a “problem” of incoherence with 
regards to water administration between national and county governments which needs fixing. 
Similar views have been forwarded by the 2030 Water Resources Group and a CSO group 
Hakijamii (Economic and Social Rights Centre) in relation to the meaning of the Act for Kenya’s 
water sector. Both state that the purpose of the 2016 Water Act is to align the water sector with 
the Constitution’s primary objective of devolution. 
Importantly, the study shows that almost all developing countries have been undertaking 
decentralisation reforms (i.e., devolution) which have been advocated by donors and 
international NGOs with varying motives, such as a means for increasing access, use, 
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management, voice and claims over natural resources. However, literature evidence from 
numerous case studies carried out on decentralization in resource governance contexts reveal that 
the benefits associated with devolution have been elusive to achieve, not least because the 
institutional changes are rarely achieved in practice. 
The thesis further shows that the change in approach (i.e., decentralisation reforms) means 
different things to different stakeholders, and it opens up new spaces for stakeholders to make 
demands from the national government as well as foster expectations among local communities 
and governments. A common feature in the critiques was that the new 2016 Water Act 
maintained decision-making and use of power at the national government level while devolving 
the task of water services provision to the local governments. These debates surrounding the 
launch of the 2016 Water Act can be seen as a negotiated arena, where different discourses, 
tensions and controversies compete with regards to what kind of legislation should prevail and 
who should have the power to define these regulations. In the midst of these struggles about the 
new Act, different meanings and practices emerge such as shared understandings of what local 
management of water resources entails and how it should be practiced. 
In conclusion, the findings in this thesis indicate that a single process such as decentralisation 
cannot capture the full complexity of issues in water resources decentralisation. It is more 
complex than other resources such as forest decentralisation for a variety of reasons, including its 
direct, daily importance to livelihoods as well as the interests of corporate users, such as for 
irrigated agriculture; the distinction between the resource itself and service provision; and its 
fluidity through space. Despite these complexities, the central issues discussed in this study 
remain relevant in providing insights and lessons into natural resources decentralisation 
processes and efforts in the context of Kenya as a developing country.  
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